Gold stocks are  defensive  fact or fiction by Paul, John Scott
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1974 
Gold stocks are "defensive" fact or fiction 
John Scott Paul 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Paul, John Scott, "Gold stocks are "defensive" fact or fiction" (1974). Graduate Student Theses, 
Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5892. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5892 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
GOLD STOCKS ARE "DEFENSIVE" 
FACT OR FICTION
By
John S, Paul 
B.S., University of Nebraska, 19&9
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of 
Master of Business Administration 
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA
1974
Approved byi
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Purpose of the Study 
The primary objective of this study was to determine 
if a select group of gold stocks (ASA, Ltd., Homestake, Dome 
Mines, and Lake Shore Mines) are defensive. The issue exam­
ined was the relationship between gold stocks and inflation 
as measured by popular stock indexes. The period covered by 
the study was January 1950 through October 1973.
Analysis of the Problem 
Today the average U.S. citizen considers the state 
of the U.S. economy and inflation to be one of the major 
problems in America. According to Business Week some of the 
central areas of concern are whether or not the factories 
will have enough energy to stay in operation and if the fac­
tories do stay in operation, but at a decreased capacity, 
how many employees will be laid off— temporarily or perman­
ently.^ Inflation has recently been climbing at an alarming
rate. In 1973 the wholesale price index increased 18.2 per 
2cent. The Dow Jones Futures Index on 31 December 1973 was
^"How the Energy Crisis Will Hit Industry," Business 
Week. 24 November 1973, pp. 56-62.
2"Wholesale Prices Increased Sharply Again Last 
Month," The Wall Street Journal. 9 January 1974, p. 3.
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320.50 compared to 184.58 on the same date in 1972.^ Inves­
tors have watched the Dow Jones Industrial Average collapse 
from a peak of 1051.51 in January 1973 to a low of 817.73 in 
November 1973. On November 26, 1973 the DJIA was down 29.05 
points, the steepest drop in eleven years. Only 149 issues 
advanced and 1,518 declined. The headline of the "Abreast 
of the Market" column of the Wall Street Journal, November 27, 
1973 states I "Industrials Skid 29.05, Steepest Drop in 11 
Years I Action is Termed "Panic" Over Energy Crisis."
Problems like this face the investor today. How can 
the investor protect his capital— perhaps one answer is with 
an investment in gold stocks. Are gold stocks a defense 
against such general economic conditions? To analyze this 
problem, one needs first to look at general economic condi­
tions as they currently exist and as they have changed over 
the past forty years.
Energy Chief William E. Simon, in several interviews, 
has stated that the energy crisis is very real, and will be 
a major concern for at least the next five to ten years. The 
energy crisis came to a head when the Arab nations insti­
tuted a boycott of oil shipments to the U.S. and a reduction 
of oil shipments to Europe and Japan. The boycott will not 
effect the U.S. as severely as it will Europe and Japan for 
the U.S. imports only 10 to 20 per cent of its oil while most
^"Commodity Indexes," The Wall Street Journal. 
2 January 1974, p. 14.
3
European countries import approximately 50 per cent of their 
oil from the Arab states, Japan imports approximately 80 per 
cent of its energy needs from the Middle East.
Even though the boycott is but several months old, 
it is having a large impact on the everyday lives of Ameri­
cans. Fuel oil for business is being cut, gasoline is in 
short supply, and homes throughout the nation are expected to 
be cooler during the winter of 1973-1974. Airlines are lay­
ing off employees by the thousands and the plastics industry 
is projecting a possible layoff of 1.6 million workers in 
1974,̂  The major auto manufacturers are closing plants for 
weeks at a time. The President has banned the sale of gaso­
line on Sundays. The energy situation is very new and new 
reports are coming out of Washington, D.C. daily. It is 
almost impossible to keep abreast of the situation. It is 
not the intent of this study to analyze the energy crisis. 
Suffice it to say that the energy crisis has had, to this 
point, a very devastating effect on current market conditions, 
the economy, business in general and investor psychology.
The next concern of the investor is that of infla­
tion. Inflation is very high in the U.S. today. Table 1-1 
compares the rate of inflation in eight selected commodities 
from 1934 to 1971, 1934 to 1973, and 1971 to 1973. The 
increase in prices for the commodities is high but how does
^"Energy Crisis 1 Where Shutdowns and Cutbacks Will 
Hurt Labor," Business Week. 24 November 1973# P» 60.
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it translate into products? In a book about to be published, 
Economics for the Layman by Vern Hughes, a very interesting 
comparison, summarized in Table 1-2 is made. As can be seen 
from the chart, the increase in prices average over 600 per 
cent. In addition, the 1973 prices used are relatively low 
compared to current prices.
Another method of measuring increases in prices is 
the Consumer Price Index, Table 1-3 shows the increase in 
the Consumer Price Index from 1934-1973*
By examining Table 1-1, Table 1-2, and Table 1-3 it 
is not difficult to determine that inflation is very defin­
itely with us. The price increases in Table 1-1 are very 
substantial. From 1934 to August 1973 the price of cocoa 
has increased 1620 per cent. The average price increase of 
the eight commodities from 1934 to September 1973 is 1078.11 
per cent. The average price increase of the eight commodi­
ties from 1971 to September 1973 is 183,55 per cent with 
most of the increase coming in the last ten months.
Several investment advisors think this may be the 
start of hyperinflation.
During a hyperinflation, prices actually explode 
upward, causing massive economic disruptions. Prob­
ably the most famous recent example of hyperinflation 
was post WWI Germany.5
Table 1-4 shows specifically what happened to the German Mark
following World War I.
^Bernard Nagengast, "Hyperinflation - How to Come Out 
Ahead," The Forecaster (Tarzana, Calif,i Forecaster Publish­
ing Co., Inc.), 29 August 1973*
TABLE 1-1
TYPICAL COMMODITY PRICES 193% - 1973
Commodity
1934
Valued 1971Value^
Increase
1934-1971
1973Value
Year High 
1973 Date
io Increase
1934-1973
% Increase
1971-1973
Corn $0.25Au $l,25/bu 400 $ 3.44/bu Aug 17 1276 175.2
Wheat .50/bu 1.50/bu 200 5.48/bu Aug 24 996 265.3
Cotton .10/lb .30/lb 200 .875/lb Sep 1 775 191.7
Sugar .01/lb .08/lb 700 .102/lb May 28 920 27.5
Cocoa .05/lb .25/lb 400 .86/lb Jul 23 1620 224.0
Wool .20/lb .60/lb 200 3.01/lb Mar 23 1405 401.7
Silver .50/oz 1.50/oz 200 3.18/oz Jul 23 536 112.0
Copper .08/lb .56/lb 600 .957/lb Aug 11 1096.9 71.0
Average of Above Eight 
Commodities 362.5 1078.11 183.55
Gold $35/oz $U2/oz** 20 $127.50/oz** Jul 6 264.3 203.6
SOURCE I Information in Columns 2, 3 and 4 are contained in Donald J. Hoppe, How to 
Invest in Gold Stocks and Avoid the Pitfalls, (New Rochelle, N.Y.i Arlington House, 
Ï972), Fig. 12, p. 145. Information in Columns 5 and 6 are from D. A, Davidson and Co., 
Great Falls, Montana.
♦Prices rounded off to nearest cent. ♦♦London Market Price
TABLE 1-2
TYPICAL PRICE INCREASE IN CONSUMER 
PRODUCTS 1934-1973
Commodity, 
Product or Senrice
1934Price Factor 1973Price
Loaf of Bread (Standard) $ .10 5 $ .5 0
Quart of Milk .10 4 .40
Men's Work Shoes 
(Penney's Best) 2.98 4+ 12.98
Pound of Hamburger 
(1934 - 3 lbs/$.25) .10 8 .79
Deluxe Chevrolet Sedan (Pull-Siae) 820.00 5 4000.00
Thousand Feet of Lumber 
(At the Yard) 2 5 .0 0 10 2 5 0 .0 0
Regular Letter Postage .02 5 .10
Hourly Rate Day Laborer 
(RR Section) .2 5 6 1 .5 0
Slick-Paper Magazines .10 6 .6 0
Moyie Ticket .2 5 8 2.00
Haircut (Men) .2 5 8 2.00
Gallon of Regular Gas .16 3
-5+
.48
SOURCEI Vern Hughes, Economics for the Layman, cited 
by Vern Myers, Myers Finance and Energy (Calgary. Alberta. 
Canada: V e m  Myers), 22 Noyember 1973» p. 4,
TABLE 1-3
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
1947-1949 = 100
Year All Items Year All Items Year All Items
1934 57.2 1948 102.8 1962 129.2
1935 58.7 1949 101.8 1963 130.8
1936 59.3 1950 102.8 1964 132.5
1937 61.4 1951 111.0 1965 134.8
1938 60.3 1952 113.5 1966 138.7
1939 59.4 1953 114.4 1967 142.7
1940 59.9 1954 114.8 1968 148.7
1941 62.9 1955 114.5 1969 156.7
1942 69.7 1956 116.2 1970 166.0
1943 74.0 1957 120.2 1971 172.6
1944 75.2 1958 123.5 1972 181.2
1945 76.9 1959 124.6 1973 189.5
1946 83.4 I960 126.5
1947 95.5 1961 127.8
SOURCEI See U.S. Department of Commerce, Business Statis» 
tics. 1957 Biennial Edition (Washington D.C,: Government 
Printing Office, 1957% p, 26; U.S., Department of Commerce, 
1973 Business Statistics. 19th Biennial Edition (Washington, 
D.C.i Government Printing Office, 1973)» P* 40. "Selection 
and Opinion," Value Line (New York: Arnold Bernhard and Com­
pany , Inc.), 12 April 1974.
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TABLE 1-4
INFLATION OF THE GERMAN MARK 
1914-1923
Date
Exchange Value 
of Mark*
31 July 1914 4.2M » $1.00
31 December 1918 8.4
31 December 1919 28
31 December 1920 74
31 December 1921 162
31 December 1922 7,000
31 July 1923 160,000
1 October 1923 242,000,000
20 November 1923** 4,200,000,000,000
SOURCEI Hoppe, How to Invest in Gold Stocks, p. 6 3 .
*Per U.S. Dollar, based on official quotationst black 
market rates were considerably higher after 1920,
**Last official quotation for old mark; conversion rate 
establishes 30 November 1923 at one trillion-to-one with new
Reichsmarks, i,000,000,000,000 M = 1 RM
4.2 RM « $1.00
9
Mr. Bernard Nagengast (see Appendix A) has presented 
an excellent outline of the theory of hyperinflation. The 
understanding of hyperinflation is critical to understanding 
why gold stocks are recommended by many investment services 
as a hedge against inflation. Many analysts and investors 
feel that the U.S. is now in the second stage of hyper­
inflation.
Historically, gold has had many uses and commanded 
a great deal of power. In fact the historians Gibbon and 
Mommsen cite the loss of gold and a chronic debasement of 
its currency as being among the chief causes of the collapse 
of the Roman Empire.^ V»Tiat are the properties of this soft, 
yellow metal that could partially cause the fall of the Roman 
Empire and yet be called by John Maynard Keynes, "this bar-
7barous relic."
Its greatest strength is its indestructibility.
Unlike silver it does not tarnish and it is not 
corroded by acid— except by a mixture of nitric 
and hydrochloric acid. Gold coins have been recov­
ered from sunken treasure ships after two centuries 
beneath the sea, looking as bright as new. . . .
The first appeal of gold was strictly aesthetic.
Soon its beauty and versatility recommended it above 
all other metals. It was almost as soft as putty, 
so malleable that it could be hammered cold by even 
a primitive goldsmith until it was a thin translus- 
cent wafer only five-millionths of an inch thick.
One ounce of gold can be beaten into a sheet cover­
ing 100 square feet. It is so ductile that one 
ounce can be drawn into fifty miles of thin gold
^Hoppe, How to Invest in Gold Stocks, p. 24.
^Timothy Green, The World of Gold (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1970), p. 18.
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wire or plate a thread of copper or silver wire 
1,000 miles long. . . .  It is such an excellent 
conductor of electricity that a microscopic cir­
cuit of liquid gold 'printed' on a strip of plastic 
can replace miles of wiring in a computer. . . .
Yet in volume it is so dense that all the 70,000 
tons mined between 1492, when Columbus discovered 
America, and the end of 196? could be contained in 
a vault measuring only 54 feet on each side.*
These are the physical properties of gold. However, 
gold has another property that may be more important— that of 
being used as a medium of exchange and a store of wealth. 
Broadly speaking, money can be anything that is generally 
agreed upon to be an acceptable medium of exchange. The 
only commodity that has ever acquired a universal acceptance 
as money has.been gold.* King Gyges of Lydia (in Asia Minor) 
established the world's first mint about 700 B.C. making 
coins that were 75 per cent gold and 25 per cent silver.
The first pure gold coins were struck by another Lydian 
monarch, Croesus (5^0 - 546 B.C.).^^ Since this historic 
coinage in Lydia, all major civilizations or countries with 
world power or dominance have used some form of gold coinage 
or a gold backed currency at some time in their period of 
dominance as a means of facilitating trade and commerce with­
in, and outside of, the country's or the empire's sphere of 
influence. Because gold was used in coinage it was greatly
®Ibid., p. 19.
Q̂Hoppe, How to Invest in Gold Stocks, p. 27. 
p. 31.
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sought after by individuals for personal wealth and by govern­
ments for power. Can both objectives be fulfilled— or are 
they mutually exclusive? Mr. Donald J. Hoppe gives an example 
of how government action toward gold can help individuals 
attain personal wealth.
As an example, let us take the case of Campbell 
Red Lake Mines (ticker symbol CRK), one of the 
senior golds listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
During the peak of the March I968 crisis, the price 
of gold on the London market reached $44 per ounce.
From December of I966 to March I9 6 6, CRK rose from 
its previous low of $16 per share to a high of $4? 
per share, a capital gain of I60 per cent. But 
following the crisis high, the London gold price was, 
as we noted, forced back to par ($3 5) and it reached 
that level in December of I9 6 9. During this identical 
period, CRK fell from its all-time high of $4? per 
share to .a low of $15» reached also in December of 
1 9 6 9, for a loss of 68 per cent. However, as soon 
as the IMF-South African accord was approved, the 
London market began a slow but persistent rise, and 
the price of bullion crossed $41 per ounce in May of 
1 9 7 1. During this identical time, CRK moved from its 
$15 low to a May 1971 high of $35 per share— a gain of 
133 per cent.
I have used CRK as a typical example, but Home­
stake, Dome Mines and American-South African, among 
the listed golds, made moves of equivalent scope and 
duration.12 _
This is a basic background for the situation the 
investor finds himself in today in respect to gold and gold 
stocks. Many investment service letters today are recommend­
ing the purchase of gold stocks for two basic reasons 1 (1) as 
a hedge against inflation and (2) for capital preservation
For a complete discussion of the history of gold coinage see Donald J. Hoppe, How to Invest in Gold Stocks and 
Avoid the Pitfalls, pp, 23-99.
p. 2 0 7.
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and capital gains as a defensive stock in a declining market. 
According to various letters (some listed below) the two 
reasons for owning gold stocks now are intertwined. Editors 
of several letters feel that the increas in money supply must 
be slowed down by the government.
The total amount of coins and paper money in 
this country for every man, woman and child was 
$322.08 per person as of June 30, 1973* and this 
estimated amount is growing. That compares with 
only $296,84 just a year earlier. In the mid- 
1960s the total per person was $177,47*^
The slow down in inflation would reduce the amount of money 
in circulation causing tight money, fewer loans, less dispos­
able income, and therefore a general decrease in business 
activity with decreased profits, and a general depression. 
During a depression the gold stocks should react as a defen­
sive stock, characterized by Cohen and Zinbarg as;
Stocks which are regarded as stable and relatively 
safe, especially in a period of declining business 
activity. In a period of economic weakness these
^Some of the investment services are; Dow Theory 
Letters. Inc.. Richard Russell, P.O. Box 1759» La Jolla, 
Calif. 92037; Schaefer's "Current Market Opinions." The Dow 
Theory Trader." E. George Schaefer, 910-916 East 38th Street, 
Indianapolis, Indiana 46205; Baxter. Bill Baxter, 51 Weaver 
Street, Greenwich, Conn. O683O; The Powell Monetary Analyst. 
Reserve Research Ltd., 63 Wall Street, New York, New York 
10005; The International Harrv Schultz Letter. Harry Schultz, 
P.O. Box 1161. Basel 4002. Switzerland; The Dines Letter. 
James Dines and Co., Inc., 18 East 41st Street, New York,
New York 10017.
George Schaefer, Schaefer's Current Market 
Opinions (Indianapolis; E. George Schaefer), 19 November 
1973, p. 548.
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stocks tend to decline less than other more glamor- 
ous market leaders, and some types may actually rise. ^
Gold stocks during the Great Depression did react according 
to Cohen and Zinbarg*s definition. Homestake and Dome are 
just two examples.
Table 1-5 and Table 1-6 indicate that Homestake 
Mining and Dome Mines clearly outperformed and increased in 
value at a much greater rate than the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, However, is this always the case? Do gold stocks 
always react in a defensive manner or was this just an iso­
lated case that has caused people to think that gold stocks 
are defensive.
One type of company that is preeminently defensive 
is the gold mine. In a recession or depression, 
while all other prices may go down, the price of 
gold either remains fixed or is raised, while 
costs of mining decrease. As a result, in bear , 
markets gold-mining shares have tended to rise.i^ 
(Underlining mine.)
An examination of this last sentence (underlined) was the
focal point of this paper. It was the intention of this
paper to examine the performance of ASA, Ltd., Dome Mines,
Homestake Mining and Lake Shore Mines in relation to the Dow
Jones Industrial Index, the Standard and Poor's 500 Composite
Index and the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index to see
if these gold stocks do in fact tend to rise in bear maurkets.
^^Jerome B. Cohen and Edward D, Zinbarg» Investment 
Analysis and Portfolio Management (Homewood, Illinoisi Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc.,19^7)» p. 21.
p. 22.
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The period of time examined was January 1950 through October 
1973* To the author's knowledge no study of this type has 
been previously accomplished.
TABLE 1-5
DOW JONES STOCK MARKET INDEX, 1927-1937
Year High Low
1927 . . • e e e e e e e 202 # 4 0  # . . . . . . .  1 5 2 . 73
1928 . . . e e • e t • e 3 0 0 .0 0  . . • ....................  1 9 1 .3 3
1929 . . • e e • s e • e 3^1*17 e . . . . . . .  1 9 8 .6 9
1930 . • . e e 0 # e e • 2 9 4 .0 7  e . . .......... 1 5 7 .5 1
1931 . . . # e e e • e e 1 9 4 .3 ^  . . . .......... 7 3 .7 9
1932 . . . . . . . . . .  8 8 . 78 . . # . • . . . 4 1 a 22
1933 . . . • • # . e . . .  1 0 8 .6 7  . . . • • • . . 5 0 .1 6
1934 . . . . . . . .  e • 1 1 0 .7 4  . . . ....................  8 5 .5 1
1935 . . . .............................. 1 4 8 .4 4  . . . • • . • • 9 6 . 71
1936 . . . . . . . . . .  1 8 4 .9 0  . . . ....................  1 4 3 .1 1
1937 . . . . . . . . . .  1 9 4 .4 0  . . . ....................  1 1 3 .6 4
SOURCE1 Maurice L. Farrell, ed.. Dow Jones Investor's
Handbook (Princeton. New Jerseyi Dow Jones Books, 1 9 7 3 ) ,
p . 54
TABLE 1 -6
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE PRICES1
HOMESTAKE MINING COMPANY AND DOME MINES
- 1929 -  1937
Dome Mines Homestake
Low 1929 .
High 1930 .
1931 .
1932 .
1933 .
1934 .
1935 .
1936 .
1937 .
SOURCEI Hoppe, How to Invest in Gold Stocks, pp. 119-120.
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Notes related to Table 1-61 
Homestake Dividendsi
From July 1934 to May 1937# Homestake Mining Company 
paid $2 oer month extra in dividends, and on 5 December 1935 
declared an additional extra dividend of $20 per share• All 
these extras were in addition to the regular annual rate 
(paid quarterly) of $7 per share. The ten year record of 
Homestake dividends from 1928 to 1938 is as followsi
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
$ 7.00 7.00 8.00 8.45 10.60
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
$15.00
30.0056,00
36.00
18.00
Dome Dividends:
Dome Mines dividends for the period 1928 through 
1937 were:
1928 , , . $1,00 1933 . . . $1.80
1929 . . , 1.00 1934 . . . . 3.50
1930 . . , 1.00 1935 . . .
1931 . . . 1.00 1936 . . .1932 . , . 1.30 1937 . . . . 4.50
Homestake stock was split 8 for 1 in 1938, increasing authori 
zed capital shares from 251,160 to 2,009,280.
SOURCE: Hoppe, How to Invest in Gold Stocks, pp, 119-120*.
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY
General Approach 
The general approach undertaken in this study was to 
run a correlation between end of the month stock prices and 
end of the month market indices. Stocks of ASA, Ltd. (form­
erly American-South African, Ltd.), Dome Mines, Homestake 
Mining, and Lake Shore Mines were chosen because Barron*s 
uses these four stocks to compile the Barron's Gold Mining 
Stock Group Average. This average is compiled as follows#
ASA price x 9.978 =
Homestake price x 2 =
Dome Mines price x 1 a
Lake Shore Mines price x 1 =
total
Total * 4 = Gold Mining Stock Average^
The Gold Mining'Stock Average is then graphed in conjunction 
with the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Fig. 2-1 is the 
Barron's Gold Mining Stock Graph as it appeared in the Bar­
ron's Magazine June 23# 1973.^
Another reason that these four stocks were chosen is 
that each is traded on a major U.S. stock exchange. ASA, Ltd.
^Farrell, Dow Jones Investor's Handbook, p. 54. 
^Barron's. 23 June 1973, p. 6l,
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(ticker symbol ASA), Dome Mines (ticker symbol DM) and Home­
stake Mining (ticker symbol HM) are all listed and actively 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange while Lake Shore Mines 
(ticker symbol LKK) is traded on the American Stock Exchange. 
ASA, Ltd. was the only stock not listed in 1950, which is the 
beginning of this study. ASA, Ltd. started trading on the New 
York Stock Exchange in December of 1958.
Pig. 2-1. Barron's Gold Mining Stock 
Graph 23 June 1973
11; 1111111111111111 'I in n i ri i t 11
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These four stocks represent a general cross-section 
of the types of gold stocks available to the investor. ASA, 
Ltd., as a company, has no mines. Its assets are a large 
portfolio of quality South African gold mining stocks. ASA 
is considered a gold mining finance house. Dome Mines has 
controlling interest in several Canadian gold mines, one of 
which is Campbell Red Lake Mines (NYSE - CRK), the leading 
and most efficient gold producing mine in Canada. Homestake 
Mining Company was chartered in California 5 November, 1877, 
and is the largest gold producer in the Western Hemisphere.
18
Homestake has paid dividends each year since 1879 except in 
1920 and 1943-194$. Lake Shore Mines was at one time a gold 
producer. The last gold was produced in 1970. Lake Shore is 
now essentially a holding company with substantial gold 
interests.
These four stocks were correlated with three market 
indicatorsI the Dow Jones Industrial Average» the Standard 
and Poor's $00 Composite Index» and the New York Stock Ex­
change Composite Index. The Dow Jones Industrial Average 
was chosen for two reasons. One» all the stocks are consider­
ed to be industrial stocks» and two» it is the most common 
index used in stock market studies. The Standard and Poor's 
$00 Composite Index was used because it is regarded as the 
best constructed of the market indices. The New York Stock 
Exchange Composite Index was used because it would give a 
comparison of the gold stocks performance against the perform­
ance of all the stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
— not just a selected few which is the case with the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average.
The period of study selected was January 19$0 through 
October 1973* This period was selected for several reasons. 
First» the period covers a length of 274 months which is long 
enough to give statistically valid information and gives a 
long term view of both the general stock market and the indi­
vidual stocks to be analyzed. During this period the United 
States has had five Presidentsi three Democrats— Truman»
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Kennedy t and Johnson, and two Republicans— Eisenhower and 
Nixon. The period of 1950 through 1973 also had other signi­
ficant events take place. For example, the launch of Sputnik 
in 1957# the U.S. diplomatic split with Cuba in i9 6 0, Presi­
dent Kennedy's assassination in 1963# the wage-price freeze 
in 1 9 7 1# a free market gold price of $127 per ounce reached 
in 1 9 7 3» prime interest rate of 10 per cent and the Arab oil 
boycott in 1 9 7 3.
Assumptions
There were three basic assumptions made in this study#
1. Month end stock prices and month end indices over 
a long period of time reflect historical trends
2 . Indices tend to rise during inflationary periods 
and decline during non-inflationary periods
3 . If gold stocks go up in a beau* market and 
down in a bull market they will have statis­
tically significant negative correlations 
with the mairket indices
The approach used in this study was to run correla­
tions of the individual stocks with the maurket indices. The 
first step in doing this was to define bull and bear mairket 
periods from January 1950 through October 1973# The major 
bull and beau* market periods from 1950 - 1973 are contained 
in Table 2-1.^ The dates and type of mau*kets contained in 
Table 2-2 were used for ASA, Ltd.*
^Karen Kidder, "Wall Street# Before the Fall," 
Monthlv Review Supplement. 1970, Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco, p. 19.
20
TABLE 2-1
BULL AND BEAR MARKETS 
JANUARY 1950 - OCTOBER 1973
Dates
Duration
(Months) Type
Jan 1950 - Jan 1953 37 Bull
Feb 1953 - Sept 1953 8 Bear
Oct 1953 - July 1956 34 Bull
Aug 1956 - Dec 1957 17 Bear
Jan 1958 - July 1959 19 Bull
Aug 1959 - Oct I960 15 Bear
Nov I960 - Dec 1961 14 Bull
Jan 1962 - Oct 1962 10 Bear
Nov 1962 - Jan 1966 39 Bull
Feb 1966 - Oct 1966 9 Bear
Nov 1966 - Dec 1968 26 Bull
Jan 1969 - May 1970 17 Bear
Jun 1970 - Apr 1971 11 Bull
May 1971 - Nov 1971 7 Bear
Dec 1971 - Jan 1973 14 Bull
Feb 1973 - Oct 1973 9 Bear
SOURCE I January 1950 through May 1970 information by 
Karen Kidder in "Wall Streets Before the Pall," and June 
1970 through October 1973 information by the author.
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TABLE 2-2
BULL AND BEAR MARKETS 
DECEMBER 1958 - OCTOBER 1973
Date Duration(Months) Type
Dec 1958 - July 1959 8 Bull
Aug 1959 - Oct i960 15 Bear
Nov i960 - Dec 1961 14 Bull
Jan 1962 - Oct 1962 10 Bear
Nov 1962 - Jan 1966 39 Bull
Feb 1966 - Oct 1966 9 Bear
Nov 1966 - Dec 1968 26 Bull
Jan 1969 - May 1970 17 Bear
Jun 1970 - Apr 1971 11 Bull
May 1971 - Nov 1971 7 Bear
Dec 1971 - Jan 1973 14 Bull
Feb 1973 - Oct 1973 9 Bear
SOURCE I January 1950 through May 1970 information by 
Karen Kidder, "Wall Street# Before the Fall," and June 1970 
through October 1973 information by the author.
The data needed for this study and their sources are:
1. The closing price of Dome Mines, Homestake 
Mining, and Lake Shore Mines for the last day 
of trading for each month from January 1950 
through October 1973. The prices were found 
in selected issues of The Wall Street Journal
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2, The closing price of American-South African,
Ltd. (name change to ASA, Ltd. in June 1973) 
for the last day of trading for each month from 
December 1956 through October 1973* The prices 
were found in selected issues of The Wall Street 
Journal
3, The closing average of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average for the last day of trading for each 
month from January 1950 through October 1973,
This average was found in selected issues of 
The Wall Street Journal and in the Dow Jones 
Investors Handbook
4, The closing average of the Standard and Poor's 
500 Composite Index for the last day of trading 
of each month from January 1950 through October 
1973* This index was found in Standard and 
Poor's Trade and Securities Statistics Security 
Price Index Record from January 1950 through 
February 1972. The Index was found in Barron's 
from March 1972 through October 1973
5* The closing average of the New York Stock 
Exchange Composite Index for the last day of 
trading of each month from January 1950 through 
October 1973* This index was found in New York 
Stock Exchange Indexes for the period January 
1950 through December I9 6 8. The index for the 
period January I969 through October 1973 was 
found in The Wall Street Journal
6, A separation of the stock market performance 
into bull and bear msurkets for the period Janu­
ary 1950 through October 1973* A chart showing 
the major bull and bear markets from September 
1929 through May 1970 is contained in Wall Street1 
Before the Fall published by the Federal Reserve
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Bank of San Francisco, The bull and bear markets 
from January 1950 throu^ May of 1970 as defined 
by this chart are displayed in Table 2-1, The 
remaining bull and bear markets were determined 
by the author.
Specific Methodology
The specific methodology for obtaining the required 
data for this study was accomplished in the following manners
1. Obtain the closing price of each stock for 
the last trading day of each month starting 
with January 1950 and ending with October 1973
2. Adjust each price for stock splits and stock 
dividends. Dome Mines and Lake Shore Mines 
did not have a stock split or issue stock divi­
dends during the period of study. Homestake 
Mining declared a 2 per cent stock dividend in 
March 1 9 6 7. To adjust for the stock dividend 
all stock prices from February I967 through 
August 1968 would be multiplied by 1.02. In 
September I968 Homestake stock split 2 for 1.
All stock prices from September I968 through 
October 1973 would be multiplied by 2.04. In 
May 1966 American-South African stock split 2 for
1. The stock price from May I966 through May 
1973 would be multiplied by 2. In June 1973# 
American-South African stock split again 2 for
1 and changed its name to ASA, Ltd. The stock 
price from June I973 through October 1973 would 
be multiplied by 4.
3 . Obtain the closing average for last day of 
trading for each month for the Dow Jones Indus­
trial Average, the Standard and Poor's 500
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Composite Average and the New York Stock 
Exchange Composite Average
4. Normalize all data setting the stock prices
and indices equal to 100 per cent on 31 January 
1950. The formula used was#
stock Price Adj. for Splits & Div. _ NormalStock Price 31 Jan 1950 izedValue
e.g. Dome Mines 31 January 1951
* 11032 % 100 « 110.32 (rounded to .00)
The same procedure was used to normalize 
the indices
e.g. DJIA 31 January 1951
* 1 .2 3 3 1 X  100 = 1 2 3 .3 1 (rounded to .00)
The 31 January 1950 prices used in the denomi­
nator of the equation were#
(a) Dome Mines $15,750
(b) Homestake Mining $46.750
(c) Lake Shore Mines $11.625
The 31 January 1950 closing indices used in the 
denominator of the equation were:
(a) Dow Jones Industrial Avg. 201.79
(b) Standard and Poor's 500 Comp. Avg. 17.05
(c) New York Stock Exchange Comp. Avg. 9.96
The normalization of American-South African 
was accomplished in the same manner with December 
1958 being the base period. The 31 December 1958 
price used in the denominator of the equation 
was $28.375* The 31 December 1958 indices used 
in the denominator of the equations were#
(a) Dow Jones Industrial Avg. 583*85
(b) Standard and Poor's 500 Comp. Avg. 55*21
(c) New York Stock Exchange Comp. Avg, 28.85
5* Graph the normalized values of the three stock 
indices and the normalized value of each indivi­
dual stock on semi-logarithmic graph paper.
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Semi-logarithmic graph paper was used because 
it shows the percentage increase or decrease 
of the specific stock and the percentage 
increase or decrease in the indices on a scale 
easy to work with (i.e., the increase from 100 
per cent to 200 per cent is the same distance 
on the graph as an increase from 200 per cent 
to 400 per cent)
6. Keypunch all data, format cards and instruction
cards on 80-column cards
7. Separate the cards into bull and bear market
periods in accordance with Tables 2-1 and 
2-2 and run the data through a computer using 
a correlation program and plotter
8. Test the statistical significance of the cor­
relations to the 5 per cent level of significance 
using "Percentiles of the Distribution of r when 
p a  0."^ N-2 degrees of freedom are used with 
this table
^Wilfrid J. Dixon and Prank J. Massey, Jr., Introduc­
tion to Statistical Analysis (New York# McGraw-Hill Book Co., 
1969)f Table A-30a, p. 5©9.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Correlations of Stocks to Selected Indices■ec  
The results of the correlations are contained in 
Tables 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4.
TABLE 3-1
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DOME MINES 
AND SELECTED INDICES
Period DJIA
S A P  500
Composite
Index
NYSEComposite
Index Type
Degrees
of
Freedom
Jan 1950-Jan 1953 0.8446 0.8817 0 .8 3 2 6 Bull 35
Feb 1953-Sep 1953 0.9381 0 .9 3 2 1 0.8941 Bear 6
Oct 1953-Jul 1956 -0 .3993* -0 .4513* -0.4198* Bull 32
Aug 1956-Dec 1957 0.7383 0 .7 6 6 3 0 .7 4 3 3 Bear 15
Jan 1958-JuI 1959 0.8285 0.8337 0 .8 2 6 0 Bull 17
Aug 1959-Oct 196.0 -0 .6005* -0 .5406* -0 .5934* Bear 13
Nov 1960-Dec 1961 0.2894 0 .3 1 9 1 0 .3 6 3 7 Bull 12
Jan 1962-Oct 1962 -0.8420* -0 .8311* -0 .8319* Bear 8
Nov 1962-Jan 1966 0.8348 0.8227 0.8242 Bull 37
Feb 1966-Oct 1966 -0 .3 1 4 9 -0 .3 0 9 9 -0 .3 0 1 3 Bear 7
Nov 1966-Dec 1968 0 .4 7 0 6 0.6281 0.6624 Bull 24
Jan 1969-May 1970 0.8273 0 .7 1 3 8 0 .7 1 7 3 Bear 15
Jun 1970-Apr 1971 0.6887 0 .7 0 1 3 0 .7 0 0 0 Bull 9
May 1971-Nov 1971 0.5805 0.4890 0.4874 Bear 5
Dec 1971-Jan 1973 0.2828 0 .3 0 1 9 0 .3 0 4 7 Bull 12
Feb 1973-Oct 1973 -0.2728 -0 .5 4 9 7 -0 .5 5 7 0 Bear 7
"Indicates significant negative correlations# a = ,03.
26
27
TABLE 3-2
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN HOMESTAKE MINING 
AND SELECTED INDICES
Period DJIA
s & p 500
Composite
Index
NYSE
Composite
Index Type
Degrees
of
Freedom
Jan 1950-Jan 1953 -0.5613* -0 .5566* -0 .5942* Bull 35
Feb 1953-Sep 1953 0 .9 4 7 3 0 .9 5 0 5 0 .9 2 1 5 Bear 6
Oct 1953-Jul 1956 -0 .2 3 8 8 -0.2927 -0.2629 Bull 32
Aug 1956-Dec 1957 0.4235 0 .2 9 1 3 0 .3 9 0 0 Bear 15
Jan 1958-JuI 1959 O.5O83 0.5336 0 .5 1 7 7 Bull 17
Aug 1959-Oct i960 -0.4460 -0 .3 5 3 0 -0 .4 3 4 0 Bear 13
Nov 1960-Dec 1961 0.3016 0.3468 0.3756 Bull 12
Jan 1962-Oct 1962 -0 .8347* -0.8346* -0.8406* Bear 8
Nov 1962-Jan 1966 0.0946 0.0849 0 .0 8 2 0 Bull 37
Feb 1966-Oct 1966 0 .2 0 9 2 O.I872 0.2001 Bear 7
Nov 1966-Dec 1968 0 .5 1 2 2 0.6848 0 .7 1 7 6 Bull 24
Jan 1969-May 1970 0 .8 7 6 4 0.7575 0.7564 Bear 15
Jun 1970-Apr 1971 0.6489 0 .6 3 3 3 0 .6 3 5 9 Bull 9
May 1971-Nov 1971 0.5855 0.5263 0 .5 1 9 5 Bear 5
Dec 1971-Jan 1973 0.2688 0 .3 1 3 3 0.3196 Bull 12
Feb 1973-Oct 1973 -0 .6 2 8 9 -0.8015* -0 .7992* Besur 7
"Indicates significant negative correlations# a * .05.
28
TABLE 3-3
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN LAKE SHORE MINES 
AND SELECTED INDICES
Period DJIA
s * p 500Composite
Index
NXSNComposite
Index Type
Degreesof
Freedom
Jan 1950-Jan 1953 -0.0284 -0.0088 -0.0286 Bull 35
Feb 1953-Sep 1953 0.8376 0 .8 7 8 9 0.8704 Bear 6
Oct 1953-Jul 1956 -0.6242* -0 .6530* -0 .6386* Bull 32
Aug 1956-Dec 1957 0 .5 2 9 2 0.4546 0 .5 8 9 0 Bear 15
Jan 1958-Ju I 1959 0 .5 7 6 8 0 .5 6 0 3 0 .5 5 2 6 Bull 17
Aug 1959-Oct I960 0.0426 0 .1 5 9 7 0 .0 3 2 9 Bear 13
Nov 1960-Dec 1961 -0 .8606* -0 .8331* -0.8273* Bull 12
Jan 1962-Oct 1962 -0 .0 3 6 3 —0.0018 -0 .0 2 2 5 Bear 8
Nov 1962-Jan 1966 -0.2818* -0 .3310* -O.3O89* Bull 37
Feb 1966-Oct 1966 0.7882 0.7660 0 .7 7 0 2 Bear 7
Nov 1966-Dec 1968 0.7042 0.8115 0 .8 3 6 3 Bull 24
Jan 1969-May 1970 0.8765 0.7653 0 .7 7 0 3 Bear 15
Jun 1970-Apr 1971 -0.3782 -0 .3 8 6 2 -0 .3 7 2 5 Bull 9
May 1971-Nov 1971 0.6836 O.6I54 0.6087 Bear 5
Dec 1971-Jan 1973 -0.1089 -0 .0 6 7 2 -0.0611 Bull 12
Feb 1973-Oct 1973 -0.081 —0.0848 -0 .0 6 2 3 Bear 7
^Indicates significant negative correlations# « « .05.
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TABLK 3-4
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ASA, LTD. 
(AMERICAN SOUTH AFRICAN) 
AND SELECTED INDICES
Period DJIA
s & p 500Composite
Index
NYSEComposite
Index Type
DegreesofFreedom
Dec 1958-Ju I 1959 0 .5 2 7 8 0 .6 0 5 5 6.4786 Bull 6
Aug 1959-Oct I960 0 .5 2 5 3 0 .5 1 9 9 0 .3 9 0 6 Bear 13
Nov 1960-Dec 1961 -0.4406 -0 .3 6 8 3 -0 ,3 4 7 6 Bull 12
Jan 1962-Oct 1962 -0.9460* -0.9551* -0.9441* Bear 8
Nov 1962-Jan 1966 0.8100 0.7942 0 .7 9 2 7 Bull 37
Feb 1966-Oct 1966 -0.0821 -0.0804 -0 .0 7 7 9 Bear 7
Nov 1966-Dec 1968 0 .3 8 7 3 0.5836 0.6199 Bull 24
Jan 1969-May 1970 0 .8 5 4 3 0 .7 3 1 7 0 .7 2 3 1 Bear 15
Jun 1970-Apr 1971 O.8OO5 0.7895 0.7973 Bull 9
May 1971-Nov 1971 0.6814 0.6401 0 .6 3 6 8 Bear 5
Dec 1971-Jan 1973 0 .1 3 1 3 0 .1 5 0 0 0 .1 7 9 0 Bull 12
Feb 1973-Oct 1973 -0 .4 7 7 5 -0 .6988* -0.6428 Bear 7
"Indicates significant negative correlations# « » ,05.
The numbers in the tables were obtained from computer 
printouts, a sample copy of which is contained in Appendix B. 
For Dome Mines, Homestake Mining and Lake Shore Mines the 
numbers appearing under the column labeled DJIA are the cor­
relation between the stock prices normalised and the Dow
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Jones Industrial Average normalised for the period indicated. 
The numbers appearing under the columns labeled S A P  500 and 
NYSE are the correlations between the stock prices normalized 
and these other market indices.
Referring to Appendix B computer printout, correla­
tions between Dome Mines and each of the three market indices 
(DJIA, S A P  500 and NYSE) is represented by correlations 
between column two and rows eight,, ten and twelve, respective­
ly. Appendix C contains a summary of the raw data input to 
the computer and lists the content of all twelve columns 
of data.
Correlations between Homestake Mining and each of the 
three market indices and between Lake Shore Mines and each 
of the three indices is represented on the computer printout 
in a similar manner. Column four represents Homestake Mining 
and column six represents Lake Shore Mines. ASA, Ltd. was 
run separately since correlations were computed only from 
1958 through 1973 instead of 1950 through 1973*
The sample computer printout in Appendix B represents 
the period January 1950 through January 1953, a total of 
thirty-seven months. Three computer plots are also contained 
in Appendix Bi (1) a plot of Dome Mines against the DJIA 
showing a positive correlation (.8446), (2) a plot of Home­
stake Mining against the DJIA showing a negative correlation 
(-,5 6 1 3), and (3) a plot of Lake Shore Mines against the DJIA 
showing essentially no correlation (-.0284).
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS 
Dome Mines
Analysis of the correlations between Dome Mines and 
the selected indices (Table 3-1) shows that in three of the 
sixteen periods the stock was significantly negatively cor­
related at the 5 per cent level of significance with the 
indices. The first significant period was Oct 1953 - 
July 1 9 5 6, a.bull market that lasted thirty-four months.
The negative correlation means that during this bull period 
the price of Dome Mines significantly decreased. This would 
be expected reaction of a defensive stock, however, this 
was the only bull market in which the stock price of Dome 
Mines decreased at a statistically significant level. In 
all other bull markets with the exceptions of Nov i960 - 
Dec 1961 and Dec 1971 - Jan 1973# Dome Mines was significant­
ly positively correlated with the market indices. In other 
words, as the market indices went up the price of Dome Mines 
also went up. In the case of the two exceptions. Dome Mines 
is positively correlated but not at the 5 per cent level of 
significance. This action would not be exptected of a defen­
sive stock.
The stock price of Dome Mines is significantly, nega­
tively correlated with the indices during the bear periods of
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Aug 1959 - Oct i960 and Jan 1962 - Oct 1962. This means that 
during these two bear markets the indices decreased while the 
stock price of Dome Mines increased. This would be expected 
of a defensive stock. However, during the other bear mar­
kets, with the exceptions of Feb I966 - Oct 1966, May 1971 - 
Nov 1 9 7 1, and Feb 1973 - Oct 1973# the price of Dome Mines 
was positively correlated with the bear markets (the price 
of Dome went down with the general market). During the bear 
market of May 1971 - Nov 1971# Dome was also positively cor­
related but not to a significant degree. During the bear 
markets of Feb I966 - Oct I9 6 6, and Feb 1973 - Oct 1973, the 
price of Dome Mines was negatively correlated to the market 
indices but not significant at the 5 per cent level of sig­
nificance.
Homestake Mining Company 
An analysis of Homestake Mining and the selected 
indices (Table 3-2) shows that Homestake was significantly 
negatively correlated with DJIA in two periods and the S & P 
500 Composite and the NYSE Composite during three periods. 
Homestake was negatively correlated with the bull market 
period of Jan 1950 - Jan 1953# meaning that Homestake stock 
price decreased as the general market indices increased.
The bull market of Oct 1953 - July 1956 shows Homestake to 
be negatively correlated but not significant at a » ,0 5,
During the bull markets of Jan 1958 - July 1959, Nov I966 - 
Dec 1 9 6 8, and June 1970 - April 1971# Homestake was positively
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correlated with the indices. The correlations for the 
remaining bull markets were not statistically significant.
During the bear markets of Jan 1962 - Oct 1962 and 
Feb 1973 - Oct 1973, Homestake Mining was negatively corre­
lated to a significant degree. The first period was signifi­
cantly correlated with all three indices while the second 
period was significantly correlated with the S & P 500 Com­
posite and the NYSE Composite. During these two periods the 
stock price of Homestake increased as the indices decreased. 
The bear markets of Feb 1953 - Sep 1953 and Jan I969 - May 
1 9 7 0, show Homestake to be significantly positively correlated 
with the market in general. In other words, as the market 
decreased the stock price of Homestake also decreased. The 
other bear markets show Homestake to be positively correlated, 
with the exception of Aug 1959 - Oct i9 6 0, but the correla­
tion is not significant. The period Aug 1959 - Oct i960  
shows Homestake to be negatively correlated but not to a 
significant degree.
Lake Shore Mines
An analysis of the correlation between Lake Shore 
Mines and selected indices (Table 3-3) shows that Lake Shore 
is significantly negatively correlated during the three 
bull markets.of Oct 1953 - July 1956, Nov i960 - Dec I96I, 
and Nov I962 - Jan 1966. During these periods the stock 
price decreased as the indices increased. During the bull 
markets of Jan 1959 - July 1959, and Nov I966 - Dec I968 Lake 
Shore was significantly positively correlated with the indices.
During the bull markets of June 1970 - April 1971» and Dec 
1971 - Jan 1973# Lake Shore is negatively correlated but not 
to a significant degree. The bear markets of Feb 1953 - 
Sep 1953# Aug 1956 - Dec 1957# Feb I966 - Oct I9 6 6, and Jan 
1969 - May 1 9 7 0 1 all show Lake Shore to be significantly 
positively correlated with the indices. This means that as 
the market indices decreased the stock price of Lake Shore 
also decreased. The remaining bear markets show Lake Shore 
Mines to be mixed with both positive and negative correla­
tions but none of the correlations are statistically signi­
ficant at o = .0 5.
ASA. Ltd.
An analysis of American-South African (ASA, Ltd.) 
shows a significant negative correlation with all three 
indices in only the bear market period of Jan 1962 - Oct 
1 9 6 2. ASA is significantly negatively correlated with the 
S A P  500 Composite for the bear market of Feb 1973 - Oct 
1 9 7 3. During the bear markets of Aug 1959 - Oct i9 6 0, and 
Jan 1969 - May 1970, ASA is significantly positively corre­
lated, meaning that ASA went down with the rest of the mar­
ket. The bear markets of Feb I966 - Oct I9 6 6, and Feb 1973 - 
Oct 1973 show ASA to be negatively correlated but not to a 
statistically significant degree with the exception of S A ? 
500 Composite for Feb 1973 - Oct 1973. The NYSE Composite 
for this period is only .0262 away from being statistically 
significant at a « .05 and is significant at a » .10. The
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bear market of May 1971 - Nov 1971 shows ASA to be positively 
correlated but not at a significant level.
The bull markets of Nov 1962 - Jan 1966, Nov I966 -
Dec 1 9 6 8, and Jan 1970 - April I9 7I all show ASA to be sig­
nificantly positively correlated. The bull markets of Dec 
1958 - July 1 9 5 9# and Dec 1971 - Jan 1973 show ASA to be 
positively correlated but not at a statistically significant 
level. The same is true with the bull market period Nov
i960 - Dec 1961 but with a negative correlation.
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the data 
is that the general statement made by Cohen and Zinbarg 
that . , in bear markets gold-mining shares have tended 
to rise"^ is not valid for the four stocks analyzed during 
the period January 1950 through October 1973. Dome Mines 
increased in value in only two out of eight bear markets1 
Aug 1959 - Oct i960 and Jan I962 - Oct I9 6 2. Homestake also 
increased in value in two out of eight bear marketsi Jan 
1962 - Oct 1962 and Feb 1973 - Oct 1973. Lake Shore Mines 
did not increase in value during any bear market. ASA, Ltd. 
has increased in value against all three indices during the 
bear market of Jan I962 - Oct 1962 and against the S A P  500 
Composite Index during Feb 1973 - Oct 1973. The study cover­
ed almost 23 years, eight bull markets and eight beeur markets, 
for the stocks Dome Mines, Homestake Mining, and Lake Shore 
Mines. For ASA, Ltd. the study covered almost 14 years, six
^Cohen and Zinbarg, Investment Analvsis. p. 21.
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bull markets and six bear markets. These four gold stocks 
have not acted in the typical manner of a defensive stock.
To draw some conclusions about gold stocks being a 
hedge against inflation each stock must be analyzed indivi­
dually, The graphs in Appendix D show the relationship of 
the stocks to the indices. The graphs show the normalized 
values of each index and the normalized value of each stock.
It is thought that investment in common stocks provides a 
hedge against inflation. The hedge occurs, in theory, because 
as inflation increases, unemployment decreases, corporate 
profits increase, wages and dividends increase, people have 
more disposable income, and common stock prices increase.
The raise in stock prices is reflected by the rising stock 
indices.
From 31 January 1950 through 30 November 1973 the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average has increased 407,48 per cent, the 
S A P  500 Composite Index has increased 562,82 per cent and 
the NYSE Composite Index has increased 513,86 per cent. If 
you had bought the "averages" in 1950 your gain would be 
from 407 per cent to 562 per cent depending on the "average" 
you bought. If you had bought Dome Mines in 1950 you would 
have an increase of 790.48 per cent. Over the long run Dome 
Mines appears to be a better inflation hedge than the "aver­
ages," If you had bought Homestake Mining in 1950 your gain 
would be 224.14 per cent. Homestake then has not been as 
good a hedge as the "averages." Lake Shore Mines since 1950
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has lost 7 6 ,4 per cent of its 1950 value. Lake Shore has 
not been a hedge against inflation. Prom 31 December 1958 
through 30 November 1973 the DJIA has Increased 140.88 per 
cent, the S A P  500 Composite Index has increased 173.81 per 
cent and the NYSE Composite has increased 177.40 per cent. 
Also, during this period ASA, Ltd. has increased by 844.05 
per cent. ASA has outperformed the **averages" by approxi­
mately 550 per cent. ASA could very definitely be called 
a hedge against inflation.
From looking at the past it can be seen that gold 
stocks are not defensive in bear markets except possibly 
in special situations. During the Great Depression the price 
of gold was raised from $22 an ounce to $35 an ounce. The 
stockholders of gold mining companies saw the dividends in­
crease sharply and the price of their shares increase to 
fantastic levels. The same special situation could be devel­
oping at this time. In the past two years the U.S. dollar 
has been officially devalued twice and unofficially once.
The unofficial devaluation came when the two-tier system for 
gold was removed on 14 November 1973. The official price of 
gold was $42.22 per ounce and the free market price was about
$100 per ounce. The official price of gold was the price
at which the U.S. would exchange U.S. dollars for gold 
if the U.S. Government were to exchange gold for dollars—  
which it would not. The U.S. has not backed the dollar
with gold since it closed the gold window in 1968. By
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eliminating the two-tier gold system the central banks of 
the world were free to buy and sell gold on the free market. 
This unofficially devalued the dollar by 137 per cent.
The U.S. is now in a historically unique situation 
in that the U.S. is experiencing a high rate of inflation 
and increasing unemployment, at the same time. The cure for 
each is mutually exclusive and detrimental to the other. To 
check inflation the money supply might be decreased but this 
would likely cause increased unemployment. To reduce unem­
ployment the government can increase spending and increase 
the money supply. Such action alone would likely cause 
increased inflation.
Another reason that the current bear market appears 
to be a unique situation for gold stocks is that the Arab 
nations are starting to make demands that their oil be paid 
for (either partially or in total) with gold or a strong gold- 
backed currency. It only makes sense that the countries with 
gold will want to get the most oil they can with the gold.
For this reason many investment advisors are predicting a 
price of $200 or more an ounce for gold by the end of 1974. 
This would have a tremendous effect on the earnings of gold 
mines, similar to the devaluation from $22 an ounce to $35 
an ounce in 1934. At $200 an ounce for gold, Homestake Min­
ing should earn $7.20 a share and at eighteen times earnings 
should sell for $129 a share. Dome Mines should earn $9.60 
a share and at eighteen times earnings should sell for $172
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a share. The price of quality gold stocks could go much 
higher if a large number of investors want to own them. The 
number of gold shares listed on the major U.S. exchanges 
amount to a very small percentage of the total number of 
shares listed on the major U.S. exchanges. This means that 
not many shares are available to the investor and if many 
investors want gold shares then they may push the price of 
gold shares to very high levels. The supply is short and 
the demand may be high.
There is yet another reason that gold stocks may not 
show that they are defensive. This reason is the cyclic 
nature inherent in the stocks. The cyclic nature of the 
stocks was not considered in this study. The cyclic nature 
of gold stock is characterized in Fig. 4-1^ and Table 4-1,
Bu y i n g  CMmox (Distribution)
B l o w- O ff
Morkup
Accuniulot loi i
Initlol R o i l y  (Wood for fwrllior distribution)
Fig. 4-1, Typical Trading Cycle of a 
Listed Stock Price Movement Pattern.
'Hoppe, How to Invest in Gold Stocks. Fig. 22, p. 3 1 7.
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TABLE 4-1
TYPICAL TRADING CYCLE OP A LISTED STOCKi 
VOLUME AND PRICE ACTION
Market Phase Trading Volume Price Action
Accumulation Low Unchanged or 
Slowly Advancing
Markup Moderate Gradually but 
Steadily Advancing
Intermediate
Correction
Moderate One-third to One- 
Half Retreat from 
Previous High
Blowoff Heavy Rapid Advance
Buying Climax Extremely Heavy No Further 
Upward Progress
Breakdown Heavy Rapid Decline
Selling Climax Very Heavy No Further 
Downward Movement
Intermediate
Rally
Moderate to Heavy Advancing
Markdown Moderate Steady Decline 
with Occasional 
Small Rallies
Bottom Very Light Unchanged
SOURCE1 Hoppe; How to Invest in Gold Stocks. Fig. 21.
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Recommendations for Further Study
Further study of gold stocks is needed in severed.
areasI
1. The gold stock index in Barron's should be 
revised by eliminating Lake Shore Mines from 
the index and including a gold stock such as 
Campbell Red Leüce Mines. The index should be 
computed in the same manner as the DJIA is 
computed since the two are graphed against 
each other
2. A new gold stock index should be constructed 
which includes the stock of the major gold mines 
sold on the major U.S. exchanges. This index 
dhould include South African gold stock sold in 
the form of American Depository Receipts (ADRs)
3. A study similar to this study could be accom­
plished and adjust the stock prices for the 
cyclic nature of the stocks. This would elim­
inate any bias caused by the stocks being in a 
particular part of a cycle during a bull or 
bear 'market
4. A study of the price action of gold shares during 
a monetary crisis would give some insight into 
the purchase of gold mining stock during a period 
of currency instability
5. A continuation of this study should be done in 
order to see if the gold stocks in this study are 
signigicantly negatively correlated throughout 
the bear market that is currently taking place
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
During the time span of this study, it is concluded 
that the four gold stocks surveyed (ASA, Ltd., Dome Mines, 
Homestake Mining and Lake Shore Mines) are not defensive.
Dome Mines was only significantly negatively correlated with 
the selected indices in two bear markets and one bull market. 
Dome was significantly positively correlated with four bull 
markets and four bear markets. From the graphs in Appendix 
D, it can be determined that the capital gains of Dome have 
kept pace with the indices and could be termed an inflation 
hedge.
Homestake Mining was significantly negatively corre­
lated with the seldcted indices in two bear markets and one 
bull market. However, Homestake was significantly positively 
correlated with three bull markets and two bear markets. 
Homestake is currently selling at approximately 225 per cent 
above its 31 January 1950 price. By examining the graphs in 
Appendix D and the figures in Chapter I it can be seen that 
a rise of approximately 600 per cent would be needed to say 
that Homestake was a hedge against inflation.
Lake Shore Mines was significantly negatively corre­
lated with the selected indices in three bull markets and
zero bear markets. However, it was significantly positively
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correlated with two bull markets and four bear markets. The 
graphs in Appendix D show that Lake Shore has a capital loss 
of 7 6 .4 per cent from 3I January 1950 to 31 October 1973.
If the decrease in purchasing power of the dollar is also 
considered the loss is even greater. Lake Shore Mines can 
not be considered in any way an inflation hedge during this 
period.
American-South African (ASA# Ltd.) was significantly 
negatively correlated with the selected indices in one bear 
market and one index in another bear market. However# ASA# 
Ltd. was significantly positively correlated with three bull 
markets and .two bear markets. The graphs in Appendix D 
show that ASA# Ltd. has increased in value approximately 550 
per cent more than the averages over the same period of time. 
ASA# Ltd. could be termed a very good hedge against inflation.
This study has shown that from 31 January 1950 through 
31 October 1973 the theory that gold stocks are defensive is 
invalid. It has also shown that selected gold stocks can be 
a hedge against inflation in the long run. During most of 
the time span of this study the official price of gold was 
fixed at $35 per ounce. In 1972 the official price of gold 
was raised to $38 per ounce and in 1973 the official price 
of gold was raised to $42.22 per ounce. On 14 November 1973 
the two-tier gold system was abolished and technically the 
official price of gold is the free market price which on 
10 May 1974 was $1 6 7 .7 0 per ounce on the final fixing in 
London.
44
The rate of inflation in Europe and the United 
States currently varies between 8 and 18 per cent per year. 
Interest rates are at all time highs. Arab nations no longer 
want fiat currency in apyment for their oil. The Arabs are 
making overtures that oil must be paid for in part or in 
full with gold or currency convertible into gold. As infla­
tion increases, people are converting their deteriorating 
currency into something that will store value. The historic 
store of value has been gold. The unique situation of no 
official gold price, high inflation, high interest rates, 
declining stock markets throughout the world, increased 
unemployment, deteriorating currency values, and Arab talk 
of demanding gold in payment for oil presents a new situation 
that could be profitable to major gold mines. It appears 
that 1974 is shaping up like the special situation of the 
1930s for gold mining stocks. Profits, dividends, and capital 
gains are increasing as general market indices are decreasing.
APPENDIX A
HYPERIN FICTION - HOW TO COME OUT AHEAP ^
H istory shows that prolonged experim entation with fiat money u sually  
ends in inflation so se v er e , rapid and w idespread a s to be given a sp ec ia l 
name • hyperinflation. During a hyperinflation, p r ice s  actually explode up­
ward, causing m a ss iv e  econom ic disruptions. Probably the m ost fam ous 
recent exam ple of hyperinflation was post WWZ G erm any, how ever m any others  
have occurred (China from  1937 to 1949; G reece and Hungary during the la te  
1940s; France, about 1720 and 1790 ; e tc . )
CONDITIONS FOR HYPERINFLATION
H yperinflation cannot occur u n less certa in  conditions evo lve. A h is to r i­
cal study of past hyperinflations shows that three conditions are  n ecessary :
(1) The Em ergency - -  The trigger  on the gun of hyperinflation is  an **em er­
gency" requiring large  sum s of m oney, for exam ple ; w ar, which resu lts  in  
volum inous consumption of goods and se r v ic e s  within the country. If the e m e r ­
gency is  of enough m agnitude, traditional governm ent financial r e so u rc es , such  
as increased  taxes and borrowing, w ill be outstripped. When a ll traditional 
sou rces of capital are exhausted, there rem ains one lu crative  sou rce -  the  
printing p r e ss . Money can be created by printing it  -  or , in  today's strea m ­
lined econ om ies, by bookkeeping en tr ies.
(2) The M onetary S ystem  - -  F or creation  of m oney to be a viable sou rce of 
capital, the m onetary sy stem  m ust be structured to allow  it. System s in w hich  
the actual circu lating m ed ium  is  of p recious m eta ls  a r e  lim ited  in the amount 
of expansion by the supply of the precious m eta l. T rue, the supply can be added 
to from  pu rchases, extraction , and confiscation , but a ll of th ese  sou rces are- 
lim ited . A rtific ia l expansion can occur by debasing p recious m eta l coinage, but 
h ere, too, is  a lim it. Any noticeable debasem ent w ill se t in  m otion G resh am 's  
law , causing a reduction in the m oney stock through hoarding of the higher in ­
tr in sic  value m oney.
Modern p recious m eta l-pap er m oney sy stem s can be expanded, but w ith  
sim ilar  lim ita tion s. The ratio of paper to m eta l can be ra ised  ; how ever, any 
rapid su ccess io n  of changes in the ratio w ill resu lt in  c it ise n s  sw itching out of  
paper into m etal a s  they rea liz e  that defacto debasem ent is  occurring. A s a 
resu lt, the paper m oney stock d ec re a ses . Even i f  the net stock  of m eta l w as 
great enough to allow  great expansion o f the m oney supply at a se t  ratio , the 
public would s t i l l  lim it  the in crea se  by in creasin g  th e ir  p referen ce  for m eta l 
over paper as the inflation grew  w o rse .
T here is  a  "law" im plied  here: Any m onetary sy stem  w hich has a con vert­
ible^ m ateria l lim it  on i t s  m oney eupply i s  incapable o f  being hyperinflated .
Bernard Nagengast, "Hyperinflation - How To Come Out 
Ahead," The Forecaster (Tarzana, California; Forecaster Publishing 
Co., Inc.), 29 August1973•
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Thus, a m onetary sy stem  where the amount o f m oney is  decided by fiat is  
n ecessary  to allow  large  in c re a se s  in m oney supply. Such a sy stem  w ill allow  
alm ost unlim ited in crea ses  in money stock s, sim ply  through governm ent or  
central bank d ec ision s to create  w hatever amount o f m oney is  n e c essa ry .
(3) The Econom ic System  - •  The third conditions The econom ic sy stem  m ust 
be liquid enough so that money w ill e a s ily  c ircu la te . L arge in c r e a se s  in m oney  
stock are u s e le s s  u n less the money c ircu la tes  fre e ly  to purchase goods and serv#  
ic e s , causing the effect of r isin g  p r ice s .
STAGES o r  HYPERINFLATION
The h istor ica l record of hyperinflations show s that three d istin ct stages  
are encountered once the in itia l conditions have been m et.
Stage One * The in itia l cash  flow - •  Having exhausted traditional financial 
resou rces, the d ec ision  is  m ade to crea te  w hatever m oney is  needed. A s a re*  
suit of the influx of m oney |nto the econom y, consum ption in c r e a se s , b u sin ess  
booms and the theory that "inflation brings prosperity" becom es the slogan  of 
both the public and the governm ent. The s im p listic  connection between fiat 
money and prosperity  becom es estab lish ed , and it becom es expedient to con­
tinue expanding the m oney supply. The original em ergency may be so lved  and 
replaced by a new one - that of m anufacturing enough money to insure that p r o s­
perity continues.
Stage Two - A cceleratin g  Issu e and D epreciation - -  Dependant on s iz e  
and com plexity of the econom y, the surge of m oney resu lts in stead ily  r is in j  
p rices coupled with in creased  b u sin ess activ ity  for a period of tim e. H owever, 
a point is  reached w here further in c re a se s  in the m oney supply resu lt in a com ­
plex set of adverse  e ffects , which a re  sim ultaneous and interdependent. T hese  
effects are psych olog ica l, econom ic, po litica l, and so c ia l in nature, and becom e  
p rogressively  m ore w idespread as th e  hyperinflation continues.
The psychological driving force  of expectation of continuing inflation by the  
public culm inates in a 'flight* from  cash  into m ateria l goods. Future planning 
slow s a s the expectation of a w orsening future in s tills  a feeling of h o p e le ssn ess . 
B u siness becom es afraid to venture into new production. Expectation tends to 
becom e se lf-re in fo rc in g . Reduction in econom ic production and the flight from  
cash cause increasing  upward p ressu re  on p r ic e s . As p r ices  in c r e a se , expectation  
becom es m ore firm ly  entrenched, causing s t i l l  m ore upward p r e ssu r e  on p r ic e s .  
This ta il chase of few er goods -  higher p r ice s  continues as long a s the money  
supply is  inflated.
E conom ically , in creasing  demand for m ateria l goods resu lts  in a m arked  
in crease  in "velocity of circulation" - the amount o f t im es a given unit of m oney  
changes hands. The fiat m oney b ecom es "hot m oney, " rushing from  one p lace  
to another, a s  c itizen s d esire  to hold m ater ia l goods in lieu  of cash . This rapid  
turning over of the m oney supply se r v e s  to push p r ic e s , and expectations, h igher. 
U ltim ately, p r ice  in c re a se s  becom e astron om ica l, outstripping even the com ­
bined effects of m oney supply in c r e a se s  and in creased  ve loc ity  o f that m oney.
Price increases become dependent on expectation of the worst possible increase. 
Normal feedback mechanisms of the marketplace are disnqpted as prices rise so  
Xhst that businessmen cannot a sse ss  market conditions.
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As this market feedback c e a se s , p r ices m ust be blindly in creased  to cover  
a ll p ossib le  in crea ses . Returns on bu sin ess capital d ecrease  and m ay disappear  
I as a resu lt o f uncertain m arket conditions and destruction of the purchasing pow er  
of the capital base. F light of capital from  m arginal return situations to m ore  
lucrative ventures, including those outside the inflation country, en su es . Thus, 
not only is  the profit-m aking e sse n c e  of b u sin ess restr icted  by breakdown of 
.m arket feedback, but the capital base it s e lf  i s  a lso  destroyed through dilution  
and flight to safer a rea s.
A s business activ ity  s low s, unem ployment in crea ses  and rea l w ages stead ily  
drop. The dem oralising effects of low er w ages, unem ployment and r is in g  p r ice s  
further reduce productivity of the bu sin ess sec to r . N on-productive work in the 
form of paper shuffling, figure juggling, bureaucracy and speculation  begins to 
replace the productive work of m anufacturing, providing se r v ic e s , e tc . Concen* 
tration begins to shift from  production of rea l wealth into the p seu d o-b u sin ess of 
shifting ex isting  wealth from  one p lace  to another. The net resu lt is  an o v era ll 
decline in econom ic production. H ere, w e se e  the curious phenomenon of b u si­
ness d ep ression  and p rice  inflation co -ex is tin g  together.
P o lit ica l attem pts to control the econom ic conditions becom e widespread  
as the fia t money panacea begins to  fa il. A dilem m a is  evident. The inflation  
can be stopped by turning off the m oney faucet; how ever, if  th is is  done, the 
overheated econom y w ill co llap se  as it readjusts. Since this solution  is  p o liti­
cally non-expedient, it is  e a s ie r  to attem pt to "control" the econom y. Such d e­
v ices as w age-p rice  controls, capital con tro ls , cash  flow r estr ic tio n s , and 
regulations on precious m eta ls are  tried  in blind defiance to the h isto r ica l fact 
that a ll such m achinations never work. Econom ic controls only serv e  to further  
disrupt the econom y. Curiously, fa ilu re  of the controls seem s to bring on h arsh er  
controls, and elim ination of various lib er tie s  usually taken for granted becom es  
"n ecessary  for the good of the nation. " Unfortunately, such restr ic tio n s  tend to  
rem ain, even when they are finally  proven to be ineffective .
A s conditions w orsen, the so c ia l sy stem  breaks down. The fram ew ork of 
a failing econom y and extensive governm ent restr ic tion  cau ses cheating, stea lin g  
and backs tabbing to becom e n e c essa ry  and rewarding. Even the m ost stalw art 
statesm en  can be reduced to unethical g ra fters , under the traum a of hyper­
inflation.
Third Stage -  Econom ic C ollapse - -  The final stage is  the culm ination of 
the e ffects of the second stage; the econom y sim ply c e a se s  to function. P roduc­
tive bu sin ess is  nearly halted, and com plete d iscouragem ent in fects the populace. 
P r ic e  explosion  continues for a tim e through expectation and m oney supply in ­
c re a se , although the velocity  of c ircu lation  drops at th is stage. By now, the  
public has learned to avoid u se  of paper m oney w herever p o ss ib le , substituting  
m eta llic  currency, foreign  exchange and p rim itive barter. The ceasin g  of m o st  
productive b u sin ess a ll but cuts off new su p p lies, and the flight form  cash  has 
reduced a ll ex istin g  inventories to near the disappearing point. The burgeoning  
m oney supply has no p lace to go.
Economic restrictions become harshest at this point since the governm ent, 
in a panic because its medium of exchange is  unacceptable, must use brute force
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■ |i> make its  money acceptable as paym ent. A s in ea r lie r  stages, no amount of 
restr iction  or force halts the depreciation of the currency.
F inally , bu sin ess, the economy, and perhaps the governm ent and so c ia l 
system , co llapse, or the governm ent is  forced to m ake d rastic  reform s in the 
form of <1) a return to a m ateria l backed m onetary system ; (2) reduction of 
the governm ent deficit; and (3) various p o litica l and econom ic reform s designed  
to break the back of the expectation of continuing inflation .
PODGES AGAINST HYPERINFLATION
FT The eeonomy in a hypsrinflation can becom e a cauldron of financial d e ­
struction u n less one knows effective  hedging m ean s. H istory shows that the 
commonly touted inflation hedges of stock s, rea l esta te , e t c . , do w ell during  
stage one when the economy is  not disrupted. H owever, these  hedges fa il a s  
stage two begins, with its  accom panying econom ic traum a.
The only effective hedge in stages two and three is  precious m eta ls , e s ­
pecia lly  gold. In fact, the in crea se  in paper value of p reciou s m eta ls outstrips  
the depreciation of purchasing pow er, thus a profit can be m ade. The w orse  the 
conditions, the greater the d isparity  and the greater  the p o ssib le  profit. A s 
paper money becom es w orth less, precious m eta ls look in creasin g ly  good to the 
public in com parison. The valuation placed on precious m eta ls is  e sp ec ia lly  so  
when the m etal is  in coin form  w here guarantee of purity and e a se  of d iv isab ility  
becom e p lu sses when barter evo lves.
A warning is  pertinent at this point -  the hedge m ay be ille g a l. Frequently, 
in past hyperinflations, holding of precious m eta ls w as outlawed, and although 
this had no effect on the viability  of the hedge, it did crea te  r isk  of im prisonm ent 
to those who used m etals as a protection . Should th is becom e the c a se  in a future 
hyperinflation, one has three choices: L eave the country; stay and accept what­
ever consequences befall; or, break the law . This is  a d ecision  each individual 
m ust m ake. T here is  no other hedge which is  as e ffective  throughout a hyper­
inflation. In any c a se , what should the strategy be?
(1) Education: Educate you rse lf in  the m echan ics of inflation and d ep ression  -  
study econom ic h istory . Since you probably won't be able to se e  the fo rest through  
the tr e e s , past situations m ust serv e  as a basic  guide to strategy , to be m odified  
depending on individual conditions. This education should be d igested  before a 
hyperinflation is  raging - once in the situation it s e lf , a ll energy w ill be devoted
to keeping your head above the w ater.
(2) Information; In order to m odify the basic  hyperinflation s tra teg ies  gleaned  
from  your stu d ies, you m ust have a flow of current inform ation. This com es  
from  a ll the comm only used m edia; N ew spapers, m agazin es, the financial p r e ss , 
and various advisory se r v ic e s . By digesting and ruminating on the inform ation  
p resen t in a ll th ese  so u rces , you can keep abreast o f the early  sta g es of hyper­
inflation, u tiliz ing  standard inflation hedges to their  m axim um . M ost of th ese  
inform ation sou rces m ay becom e u s e le s s  in  la ter , chaotic s ta g e s , and, a t that 
tim e , m ore dependence m ust be placed on h isto r ica l p reced en ts. T his is  the 
point w here a hedge of p reciou s m eta ls a llow s you to s it  tight, for , i f  the o v era ll 
pattern of inflation changes, it w ill be the first tim e in recorded econ om ic h isto ry .
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(3) Act In Advance; A ll too often, people rea lize  what the m edicine is  after  
the d isea se  is  rampaging. You m ust be different from  the crowd, in that you 
itiust build your basic hedge ahead of everyone e lse . When everyone wants gold, 
or s ilv er , you w ill have a hard tim e getting your share. Act in advance I When 
you see the storm  clouds gathering, start preparing. U se standard inflation  
, hedges as long a s they are effective , but have a basic  precious m etal hedge, so  
 ̂ you w ill be ready when a ll Hades breaks lo o se . If you get caught short, don't 
t get em otional. Just rem em ber what you learned from  your research . H istory  1 repeats itse lf , so  even if  you start la te, you can s t ill  protect yourself. H owever,
I it's much e a s ie r , le s s  nerve-w racking, and m ore profitable, if  you have a lready  
secured yourself.
' (4) Stay Loose; Don't get m entally or physically  locked into one inflation hedge#
Be prepared to mbve your capital from  one m edium  to another as various hedges 
become le s s ,  or m ore, effective . Always have a r eserv e  of ca sh -form  capital 
to use as m oney-m aking opportunities a r ise .
(5) Be E thical; N ever protect you rself at the expense of losin g  your eth ical
standards. G reed, pride and envy resu lt in em otions which cloud c lear  thinking. 
W orse s t il l ,  subm ission  to th ese  v ice s  w ill e levate  you at the expense of o th ers. 
You want to help others, not destroy them  -  the hyperinflation is  already doing 
that. By placing eth ics f ir s t , you won't jeopard ise your safety . R em em ber, 
you have the knowledge, a  powerful weapon.
APPENDIX B
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Month
Tear
Dome
Mines
Dome - 
Normalised
Homeatake
Mining
Homestake- 
Mormallsed
LakeShore
Mines
LakeShore
Normalized
DJIA
DJIA
Normalised
S & P 500 
Composite
S & P 500 
Normalized
NYSE
Composite
NYSE -
Normalised
85
ooooooooo>->»-'H^ooooooooo^^>~>ooooooooo^'H<^^ooooooooo«^>^<ùa> -4 (f' \Jt \t> *>i M* M
C'(Z'0'0'(>0'0(̂@»0»@»0<?'0̂9»a'00'0'CO'V»UIWU%UIUIUIUIVIU*VIUlV*U%U*U*VIUIVIUIVIvnV1ViVlUI^i-"^«-**-'*"'M«i^#-'00oooooocooo«c,o^'00»o%0\0^<o^»omaeoD<DO@oDa»oDmcD(BOD-<i-^
1st -4 >0 OD 0>
WWWWWWWWWWN»l\)IWWWWWI\»WWWWWWWWWWWWI\)IVNl\*NNI\)NI\)NNNI\ll\»NNIV ^Ln#-W^WUJNI\IO'OmOO»-'0#-*0\aOh^OWI\lNf^NWJr-l-'0«g\0<COD-,j(r»V*^WNI\;M»-«l\)h^N •^9>«oaBuiO'ui<B*^uiu««4'^ovfl' <̂oaBUifN>a9O>O'Ou**ô œtO<Oa«o><0O><ouiMo>O'>ouiH>aDU)vfiisi # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # » # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # #  # # # #
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10 61 25.500 161.90 50.000 106.95 3.000 25.6111 61 27.250 173.02 51.375 109.89 3.250 27.9612 61 26.750 169.84 50.5C0 108.02 2.750 23.6601 62 25.375 161.11 48.00C 102.67 3.000 25.8102 62 24.750 157.14 48.000 102.67 2.875 24.7303 62 23.375 148.41 46.500 99.47 2.875 24.7304 62 23.750 150.79 45.250 96.79 2.625 22.5805 62 25.750 163.49 49.000 104.81 2.750 23.6606 62 27.750 176.19 54.000 115.51 3.125 26.8807 62 26.500 168.25 50.125 107.22 3.125 26.8808 62 27.000 171.43 53.625 114.71 2.750 23.6609 62 26.750 169.84 53.625 114.71 2.750 23.6610 62 26.000 165.08 52.750 112.83 2.625 22.5811 62 24.625 156.35 46.500 99.47 2.500 21.5112 62 23.125 146.83 43.125 92.25 2.250 19.3501 63 27.250 173.02 48.500 103.74 2.750 23.6602 63 27.000 171.43 48.000 102.67 2.750 23.6603 63 28.125 178.57 49.500 105.88 2.625 22.5804 63 26.000 165.08 46.000 98.40 2.375 20.4305 63 26.750 169.84 48.500 103.74 2.250 19.3506 63 27.375 173.81 50.125 107.22 2.000 17.2007 63 28.375 180.16 51.250 109.63 2.250 19.3508 63 31.250 198,41 52.000 111.23 2.125 18.2809 63 28.375 180.16 48.500 103.74 2.000 17.2010 63 26.375 167.46 47.125 100.80 2.000 17.2011 63 25.875 164.29 45.000 96.26 1.875 16.1312 63 25.500 161.90 45.000 96.26 1.875 16.1301 64 26.250 166.67 43.000 91.98 1.625 13.9802 64 26.500 168.25 46.375 99.20 1.750 15.0503 64 26.500 168.25 44.000 94.12 1.875 16.1304 64 26.000 165.08 43.250 92,51 1.875 16.1305 64 27.625 175.40 41.250 88.24 2.000 17.2006 64 26.875 170.63 42.000 89.84 1.875 16.1307 64 28.750 182.54 42.375 90.64 1.875 16.1308 64 29.000 184.13 42.250 90.37 1.875 16.1309 64 32.500 206.35 45.250 96.79 2.250 19.3510 64 31.500 200.00 46.250 98.93 2.125 16.2811 64 32.500 206.35 47.125 100.80 2.375 20.4312 64 39.375 250.00 53.125 113.64 2.000 17.2001 65 33.750 214.29 46.625 99.73 2.000 17.2002 65 36.250 230.16 49.750 106.42 2.125 18.2803 65 37.750 239.68 52.125 111.50 2.250 19.3504 65 36.375 230.95 49.750 106.42 2.125 18.2805 65 36.375 230.95 49.000 104.81 1.875 16.1306 65 35.250 223.81 48.625 104.01 1.875 16.1307 65 38.375 243.65 51.000 109.09 2.000 17.2008 65 39.750 252.38 51.125 109.36 1.875 16.13
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DATA or BMD OF MOUTH STOCK PRICES, ADJUSTED FOR STOCK SPLITS AMD STOCK DIVIDEHOS, 
NMMALIZED, AND SELECTED IMDICIES AVERAGES, NORMALIZED
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12 58 28.375 100.00 583.65 100.00 55.21 100.00 28.85 100.00
01 59 28.250 99.56 593.96 101.77 55.42 100.38 29.49 102.22
02 59 27.250 96.04 603.50 103.40 55.41 100.36 29.56 102.4603 59 26.750 94.27 601.71 103.09 55.44 100.42 29.78 103.22
04 59 27.875 98.24 623.75 106.87 57.59 104.31’ 30.99 107.42
05 59 29.750 104.85 643.79 110.30 58.68 106.29 31.39 108.80
06 59 29.625 104.41 643.60 110.27 58.47 105.90 31.01 107.49
07 59 28.500 100.44 674.88 U S . 63 60.51 109.60 32.39 112.27
08 59 28.375 100.00 664.41 113.84 59.60 107.95 31.86 110.4309 59 28.250 99.56 631.68 108.23 56.88 103.02 30.44 105.51
10 59 29.375 103.52 646.60 110.79 57.52 104.18 30.83 106.86
11 59 30.625 107.93 659.18 112.94 58.28 105.56 30.94 107.24
12 59 34.250 120.70 679.36 116.40 59.89 108.48 32.15 111.44
01 60 31.500 111.01 622.62 106.68 55.61 100.72 29.83 103.40
02 60 29.375 103.52 630.12 107.96 56.12 101.65 30.20 104.68
03 60 23.375 82.38 616.59 105.64 55.34 100.24 30.06 104.19
04 60 22.250 78.41 601.70 103.09 54.37 98.48 29.25 101.39
05 60 21.500 75.77 625.50 107.17 55.83 101.12 30.01 104.0206 60 19.875 70.04 640.62 109.76 56.92 103.10 31.04 107.5907 60 19.875 70.04 616.73 105.67 55.51 100.54 29.89 103.6008 60 22.750 80.18 625.99 107.25 56.96 103.17 30.96 107.3109 60 24.750 87.22 580.14 99.40 53.52 96.94 28.64 99.27
10 60 25.500 89.87 580.36 99.44 53.39 96.70 28.40 98.44
11 60 25.000 88.11 597.22 102.33 55.54 100.60 29.91 103.67
12 60 23.375 82.38 615.89 105.52 58.11 105.25 30.94 107.24
01 61 23.750 83.70 648.20 111.06 61.78 111.90 32.57 112.89
02 61 21.750 76.65 662.08 113.44 63.44 114.91 33.39 115.74
03 61 20.375 71.81 676.63 115.93 65.06 117.84 34.60 119.9304 61 20.250 71.37 678.71 116.29 65.31 118.29 34.81 120.66
05 61 19.125 67.40 696.72 119.37 66.56 120.56 35.36 122.5606 61 18.125 63.88 683.96 117.19 64.64 117.08 34.44 119.38
07 61 19.875 70.04 705.37 120.85 66.76 120.92 35.57 123.29
08 61 23.000 81*06 719.94 123.35 68.07 123.29 36.00 124.7809 61 20.375 71.81 701.21 120.14 66.73 120.87 35.55 123.2210 61 22.500 79.30 703.92 120.61 68.62 124.29 36.47 126.41
11 61 23.625 83.26 721.60 123.64 71.32 129.18 38.45 133.2812 61 21.000 74.01 731.14 125.27 71.55 129.60 38.39 133.07
01 62 21.375 75.33 700.00 119.93 68.84 124.69 36.50 126.5202 62 21.500 75.77 708.05 121.21 69.96 126.72 37.55 130.1603 62 22.500 79.30 706.95 121.13 69.55 125.97 37.26 129.1504 62 24.500 86.34 665.33 113.99 65.24 118.17 35.50 123.0505 62 26.500 93.39 613.36 105.09 59.63 108.01 31.91 110.61
06 62 28.625 100.88 561.28 96.17 54.75 99.17 29.33 101.6607 62 27.750 97.80 597.93 102.45 58.23 105.47 30.67 106.3108 62 29.750 104.85 609.18 104.37 59.12 107.08 31.78 110.1609 62 30.000 105.73 578.98 99.20 56.27 101.92 30.20 104.6810 62 29.750 104.85 589.77 101.05 56.52 102.37 29.30 101.56
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09 70 84.500 297.80 760.68 130.33 64.2110 70 89.500 315.42 755.61 129.46 83.2511 70 87.500 308.37 794.C9 136.06 87.2012 70 87.500 308.37 838.92 143.74 92.1501 71 87.000 306.61 868.50 148.80 95.8802 71 96.500 340.09 878.83 150.57 96.7503 71 101.500 357.71 904.37 154.95 100.3104 71 102.000 359.47 941.75 161.36 103.9505 71 92.000 324.23 907.81 155.54 99.6306 71 87.750 309.25 891.14 152.68 99.7007 71 95.500 336.56 858.43 147.08 95.5808 71 87.500 308.37 898.07 153.87 99.0309 71 87.250 307.49 887.19 152.01 98.3410 71 67.000 236.12 839.00 143.75 94.2311 71 76.250 268.72 831.34 142.44 93.9912 71 68.000 239.65 890.20 152.52 102.0901 72 92.750 326.87 902.17 154.57 104.6802 72 92.750 326.87 928.13 159.02 107.3503 72 91.500 322.47 940.70 161.18 107.2004 72 93.500 329.52 954.17 163.48 107.6705 72 104.000 366.52 960.72 164.61 109.3506 72 109.500 385.90 929.03 159.18 107.1407 72 112.000 394.71 924.74 158.44 107.3908 72 96.750 340.97 963.73 165.12 111.2309 72 93.500 329.52 953.27 163.33 110.5510 72 89.000 313.66 955.52 163.71 111.5811 72 87.500 308.37 1018.21 174.46 116.6712 72 91.250 321.59 1020.02 174.77 119.1001 73 1C1.500 357.71 999.02 171.17 116.0302 73 106.250 374.45 955.07 163.64 111.6803 73 118.500 417.62 951.01 162.94 111.5204 73 144,500 509.25 921.43 157.87 106.9705 73 165.000 581.50 901.41 154.44 104.9506 73 190.000 669.60 891.41 152.73 104.2607 73 193.000 680.18 926.40 158.73 108.2508 73 178.000 627.31 887.57 152.07 104.2509 73 164.000 577.97 947.10 162.27 108.4310 73 190.000 669.60 956.58 163.90 108.29
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